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Self-propagating North Korean job-scam malware spreads via compromised developer projects in software supply chain

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2 unique sources, 2 articles

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A North Korean state-aligned actor has transformed fake job recruitment scams into a self-propagating supply-chain attack dubbed "Contagious Interview" that infects developer workstations and propagates via compromised repositories. Void Dokkaebi (aka Famous Chollima) abuses legitimate development workflows by luring developers with fake interviews, then delivering malware via malicious VS Code tasks or hidden payloads in fonts/images. Once committed to Git repositories, the infection spreads to downstream contributors, creating a worm-like chain reaction. Developers’ credentials, crypto wallets, CI/CD pipelines, and production infrastructure are primary targets. Newly identified activity connected to the same actor’s PromptMink campaign targets cryptocurrency developers via malicious npm packages, including @validate-sdk/v2, co-authored by an AI coding assistant. The layered package strategy uses legitimate-looking tools to hide malicious payloads, with payloads evolving from credential theft to broader data exfiltration, persistence mechanisms, and cross-platform binaries. Over 60 packages and 300+ versions have been identified across seven months, with evidence of LLM integration in malware development.

Timeline

  1. 22.04.2026 17:48 2 articles · 7d ago

    Void Dokkaebi’s Contagious Interview campaign escalates to self-propagating supply-chain compromise via VS Code and Git repositories

    North Korean actor Void Dokkaebi has operationalized the "Contagious Interview" tactic into a self-sustaining supply-chain attack vector. Malicious VS Code tasks or hidden .vscode folders in compromised repositories execute automatically when opened, then propagate the infection to subsequent clones via commit history. The attack chain begins with fake job interviews targeting developers, then escalates to CI/CD pipelines and production systems as victims integrate the infected code. Blockchain-based payload staging further complicates remediation. The campaign’s scope expands with newly identified npm-based activity linked to the same actor. PromptMink leverages malicious npm packages such as @validate-sdk/v2, co-authored by an AI coding assistant (Anthropic’s Claude Opus), to target cryptocurrency developers. The layered package strategy uses legitimate-looking tools to conceal malicious payloads, which evolved from credential theft to include data exfiltration, persistence mechanisms (SSH key installation), and cross-platform binaries (Rust-based executables). Evidence of LLM integration in malware development indicates the actor’s use of automated development workflows to refine attacks. Over 60 packages and 300+ versions have been identified across seven months, underscoring sustained refinement of delivery techniques.

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