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PluggyApe Backdoor Targets Ukraine's Defense Forces in Charity-Themed Campaign

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2 unique sources, 3 articles

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Ukraine's Defense Forces were targeted in a charity-themed malware campaign between October and December 2025, delivering the PluggyApe backdoor, likely deployed by the Russian threat group Void Blizzard (Laundry Bear). The attacks began with instant messages over Signal or WhatsApp, directing recipients to malicious websites posing as charitable foundations. These sites distributed password-protected archives containing PluggyApe payloads. The malware profiles the host, sends victim information to attackers, and waits for further commands. In February 2026, a new campaign targeting Ukrainian entities was observed, employing judicial and charity-themed lures to deploy a JavaScript-based backdoor codenamed DRILLAPP. This campaign is likely orchestrated by threat actors linked to Russia and shares overlaps with the prior PluggyApe campaign. The malware is capable of uploading and downloading files, leveraging the microphone, and capturing images through the webcam. The threat actor is believed to be active since at least April 2024.

Timeline

  1. 16.03.2026 11:07 1 articles · 23h ago

    DRILLAPP Backdoor Targets Ukraine in February 2026 Campaign

    In February 2026, a new campaign targeting Ukrainian entities was observed, likely orchestrated by threat actors linked to Russia. The campaign employs judicial and charity-themed lures to deploy a JavaScript-based backdoor codenamed DRILLAPP. The malware is capable of uploading and downloading files, leveraging the microphone, and capturing images through the webcam. Two versions of the campaign were identified, with the first iteration using a Windows shortcut (LNK) file to create an HTML Application (HTA), and the second version using Windows Control Panel modules and including recursive file enumeration, batch file uploads, and arbitrary file download capabilities. The malware uses the Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) for remote file downloading. The backdoor is still in the initial stages of development, with an early variant communicating with the domain "gnome[.]com". The use of the browser for deploying a backdoor suggests attackers are exploring new evasion techniques.

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  2. 14.01.2026 01:03 3 articles · 2mo ago

    PluggyApe Backdoor Targets Ukraine's Defense Forces in Charity-Themed Campaign

    Between October and December 2025, Ukraine's Defense Forces were targeted in a charity-themed malware campaign that delivered the PluggyApe backdoor. The campaign involved instant messages over Signal or WhatsApp directing recipients to malicious websites posing as charitable foundations. These sites distributed password-protected archives containing PluggyApe payloads. The malware profiles the host, sends victim information to attackers, and waits for further commands. PluggyApe version 2, introduced in December 2025, features better obfuscation, MQTT-based communication, and more anti-analysis checks. The malware fetches C2 addresses from external sources like rentry.co and pastebin.com, published in base64-encoded form. Mobile devices are increasingly targeted due to poor protection and monitoring, and attackers use compromised accounts or phone numbers of Ukrainian telecommunication operators to make attacks more convincing. The threat actor is believed to be active since at least April 2024. The malware is written in Python and establishes communication with a remote server over WebSocket or Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT).

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A suspected Chinese threat actor, tracked as UNC2814, has conducted a global espionage campaign since at least 2017, targeting telecom and government networks. The campaign has impacted 53 organizations in 42 countries, with suspected infections in at least 20 more. The actor deployed a new C-based backdoor named GRIDTIDE, which abuses the Google Sheets API for command-and-control (C2) operations. The initial access vector is unknown, but previous exploits involved flaws in web servers and edge systems. GRIDTIDE performs host reconnaissance and supports commands for executing bash commands, uploading, and downloading files. Google, Mandiant, and partners disrupted the campaign by terminating associated Google Cloud projects and disabling known infrastructure. Organizations impacted by GRIDTIDE were notified, and support was offered to clean the infections. Google expects UNC2814 to resume activity using new infrastructure in the near future.

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HttpTroy Backdoor Deployed in Targeted South Korean Cyberattack

The North Korea-linked threat actor Kimsuky has been linked to a new campaign distributing a new variant of Android malware called DocSwap via QR codes hosted on phishing sites mimicking Seoul-based logistics firm CJ Logistics. The attack involved a ZIP file containing a Microsoft Windows screensaver (.scr) file, which displayed a PDF invoice written in Korean and loaded the attack chain until the backdoor program was running. The article also highlights the advanced obfuscation techniques used by HttpTroy to evade detection and the broader campaign by North Korean state-sponsored groups targeting various sectors. The attack is part of a broader campaign by North Korean state-sponsored groups targeting governments in the Asia-Pacific region, especially South Korea, as well as targets in the United States and Europe. Kimsuky has previously used password-protected ZIP files and AI-generated deepfake photos in their attacks. 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The use of DLL side-loading has become an increasingly common technique adopted by threat actors to evade detection and conceal signs of malicious activity by taking advantage of legitimate processes. Over the past week, at least three documented campaigns have leveraged DLL side-loading to deliver malware families tracked as LOTUSLITE and PDFSIDER, along with other commodity trojans and information stealers. In the campaign observed by ReliaQuest, the sideloaded DLL is used to drop the Python interpreter onto the system and create a Windows Registry Run key that makes sure that the Python interpreter is automatically executed upon every login. The interpreter's primary responsibility is to execute a Base64-encoded open-source shellcode that's directly executed in memory to avoid leaving forensic artifacts on disk. The final payload attempts to communicate with an external server, granting the attackers persistent remote access to the compromised host and exfiltrating data of interest. The abuse of legitimate open-source tools, coupled with the use of phishing messages sent on social media platforms, shows that phishing attacks are not confined to emails alone and that alternative delivery methods can exploit security gaps to increase the odds of success and break into corporate environments. ReliaQuest told The Hacker News that the campaign appears to be broad and opportunistic, with activity spanning various sectors and regions. "That said, because this activity plays out in direct messages, and social media platforms are typically less monitored than email, it's difficult to quantify the full scale," it added. "This approach allows attackers to bypass detection and scale their operations with minimal effort while maintaining persistent control over compromised systems," the cybersecurity company said. "Once inside, they can escalate privileges, move laterally across networks, and exfiltrate data." This is not the first time LinkedIn has been misused for targeted attacks. In recent years, multiple North Korean threat actors, including those linked to the CryptoCore and Contagious Interview campaigns, have singled out victims by contacting them on LinkedIn under the pretext of a job opportunity and convincing them to run a malicious project as part of a supposed assessment or code review. In March 2025, Cofense also detailed a LinkedIn-themed phishing campaign that employs lures related to LinkedIn InMail notifications to get recipients to click on a "Read More" or "Reply To" button and download the remote desktop software developed by ConnectWise for gaining complete control over victim hosts. "Social media platforms commonly used by businesses represent a gap in most organizations' security posture," ReliaQuest said. "Unlike email, where organizations tend to have security monitoring tools, social media private messages lack visibility and security controls, making them an attractive delivery channel for phishing campaigns." "Organizations must recognize social media as a critical attack surface for initial access and extend their defenses beyond email-centric controls."

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Chinese State-Sponsored Group Exploits Windows Zero-Day in Espionage Campaign Against European Diplomats

A China-linked hacking group, UNC6384 (Mustang Panda), is exploiting a Windows zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2025-9491) to target European diplomats in Hungary, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Serbian government agencies. The campaign involves spearphishing emails with malicious LNK files to deploy the PlugX RAT and gain persistence on compromised systems. The attacks have broadened in scope to include diplomatic entities from Italy and the Netherlands. The zero-day vulnerability allows for remote code execution on targeted Windows systems, enabling the group to monitor diplomatic communications and steal sensitive data. Microsoft has not yet released a patch for this vulnerability, which has been heavily exploited by multiple state-sponsored groups and cybercrime gangs since March 2025. Microsoft has silently mitigated the vulnerability by changing LNK files in the November updates to display all characters in the Target field, not just the first 260. ACROS Security has also released an unofficial patch to limit shortcut target strings to 260 characters and warn users about potential dangers. Security researcher Wietze Beukema disclosed multiple vulnerabilities in Windows LNK shortcut files that allow attackers to deploy malicious payloads. Beukema documented four previously unknown techniques for manipulating Windows LNK shortcut files to hide malicious targets from users inspecting file properties. The discovered issues exploit inconsistencies in how Windows Explorer prioritizes conflicting target paths specified across multiple optional data structures within shortcut files. The most effective variants use forbidden Windows path characters, such as double quotes, to create seemingly valid but technically invalid paths, causing Explorer to display one target while executing another. The most powerful technique identified involves manipulating the EnvironmentVariableDataBlock structure within LNK files to display a fake target in the properties window while actually executing PowerShell or other malicious commands. Microsoft declined to classify the EnvironmentVariableDataBlock issue as a security vulnerability, arguing that exploitation requires user interaction and does not breach security boundaries. Microsoft Defender has detections in place to identify and block this threat activity, and Smart App Control provides an additional layer of protection by blocking malicious files from the Internet. Beukema released "lnk-it-up," an open-source tool suite that generates Windows LNK shortcuts using these techniques for testing and can identify potentially malicious LNK files by predicting what Explorer displays versus what actually executes. CVE-2025-9491 was widely exploited by at least 11 state-sponsored groups and cybercrime gangs, including Evil Corp, Bitter, APT37, APT43 (also known as Kimsuky), Mustang Panda, SideWinder, RedHotel, Konni, and others.

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Russian Threat Actors Target Ukrainian and Polish Organizations with Data-Wiping Malware and LotL Tactics

Russian threat actors, specifically the Sandworm group, have targeted Ukrainian organizations and Poland's power sector using living-off-the-land (LotL) tactics and deploying data-wiping malware. The attacks, which began in June 2025, involved minimal malware to reduce detection and included the use of web shells and legitimate tools for reconnaissance and data theft. The threat actors exploited unpatched vulnerabilities to deploy web shells on public-facing servers, gaining initial access. They then used various tactics, including PowerShell commands, scheduled tasks, and legitimate software, to evade detection and perform reconnaissance. The attacks were characterized by the use of legitimate tools and minimal malware, demonstrating the actors' deep knowledge of Windows native tools. In addition to LotL tactics, Sandworm deployed multiple data-wiping malware families in June and September 2025, targeting Ukraine's education, government, and grain sectors. The grain sector, a vital economic sector, was targeted to disrupt Ukraine's war economy. The data-wiping malware used included ZeroLot and Sting, with initial access achieved by UAC-0099, who then transferred access to APT44 for wiper deployment. The activity is confirmed to be of Russian origin, with specific attribution to the Sandworm group. In December 2025, Sandworm targeted Poland's power sector with a new wiper malware called DynoWiper, aiming to disrupt the energy infrastructure. The attack, which occurred on December 29 and 30, 2025, targeted two combined heat and power (CHP) plants and a system managing renewable energy sources. The attack was unsuccessful in causing disruption, and Polish authorities attributed it to Russian services. The attack coincided with the tenth anniversary of Sandworm's 2015 attack on Ukraine's power grid. A new Russia-aligned threat activity cluster, InedibleOchotense, impersonated ESET in phishing attacks targeting Ukrainian entities starting in May 2025. This campaign involved sending spear-phishing emails and Signal text messages containing links to trojanized ESET installers, which delivered the Kalambur backdoor. InedibleOchotense is linked to the Sandworm (APT44) hacking group and has been observed conducting destructive campaigns in Ukraine, including the deployment of wiper malware ZEROLOT and Sting. Another Russia-aligned threat actor, RomCom, launched spear-phishing campaigns in mid-July 2025 exploiting a WinRAR vulnerability (CVE-2025-8088) targeting various sectors in Europe and Canada. RomCom also targeted a U.S.-based civil engineering company via a JavaScript loader dubbed SocGholish to deliver the Mythic Agent. The activity has been attributed with medium-to-high confidence to Unit 29155 of Russia's Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, also known as GRU. The targeted entity had worked for a city with close ties to Ukraine in the past. The ESET report noted that other Russian-aligned APT groups also maintained their focus on Ukraine and countries with strategic ties to Ukraine, while also expanding their operations to European entities. Gamaredon remained the most active APT group targeting Ukraine, with a noticeable increase in intensity and frequency of its operations during the reported period. Gamaredon selectively deployed one of Turla’s backdoors, indicating a rare instance of cooperation between Russia-aligned APT groups. Gamaredon’s toolset continued to evolve, incorporating new file stealers or tunneling services. The cyber attack on the Polish power grid in December 2025 was attributed with medium confidence to a Russian state-sponsored hacking group known as ELECTRUM. The attack targeted distributed energy resources (DERs) and affected communication and control systems at combined heat and power (CHP) facilities and systems managing renewable energy systems. ELECTRUM and KAMACITE share overlaps with the Sandworm cluster, with KAMACITE focusing on initial access and ELECTRUM conducting operations that bridge IT and OT environments. The attackers gained access to operational technology systems critical to grid operations and disabled key equipment beyond repair at the site. The attack was opportunistic and rushed, with the hackers attempting to inflict as much damage as possible by wiping Windows-based devices and resetting configurations. The majority of the equipment targeted was related to grid safety and stability monitoring. The coordinated attack on Poland's power grid in late December targeted multiple distributed energy resource (DER) sites across the country, including combined heat and power (CHP) facilities and wind and solar dispatch systems. Although the attacker compromised operational technology (OT) systems damaging "key equipment beyond repair," they failed to disrupt power, totaling 1.2 GW or 5% of Poland’s energy supply. Based on public reports, there are at least 12 confirmed affected sites. However, researchers at Dragos, a critical industrial infrastructure (OT) and control systems (ICS) security company say that the number is approximately 30. Dragos attributes the attack with moderate confidence to a Russian threat actor it tracks as Electrum, which, although it overlaps with Sandworm (APT44), the researchers underline that it is a distinct activity cluster. Electrum targeted exposed and vulnerable systems involved in dispatch and grid-facing communication, remote terminal units (RTUs), network edge devices, monitoring and control systems, and Windows-based machines at DER sites. Electrum successfully disabled communications equipment at multiple sites, resulting in a loss of remote monitoring and control, but power generation on the units continued without interruption. Certain OT/ICS devices were disabled, and their configurations were corrupted beyond recovery, while Windows systems at the sites were wiped. Even if the attacks had been successful in cutting the power, the relatively narrow targeting scope wouldn’t have been enough to cause a nationwide blackout in Poland. However, they could have caused significant destabilization of the system frequency. "Such frequency deviations have caused cascading failures in other electrical systems, including the 2025 Iberian grid collapse," the researchers say. CERT Polska revealed that coordinated cyber attacks targeted more than 30 wind and photovoltaic farms, a private company from the manufacturing sector, and a large combined heat and power plant (CHP) in Poland on December 29, 2025. The attacks were attributed to a threat cluster dubbed Static Tundra, which is linked to Russia's Federal Security Service's (FSB) Center 16 unit. The attacks had a purely destructive objective but did not affect the ongoing production of electricity or the heat supply to end users. The attackers gained access to the internal network of power substations associated with a renewable energy facility to carry out reconnaissance and disruptive activities, including damaging the firmware of controllers, deleting system files, or launching custom-built wiper malware codenamed DynoWiper. In the intrusion aimed at the CHP, the adversary engaged in long-term data theft dating back to March 2025, enabling them to escalate privileges and move laterally across the network. The attackers' attempts to detonate the wiper malware were unsuccessful. The targeting of the manufacturing sector company is believed to be opportunistic, with the threat actor gaining initial access via a vulnerable Fortinet perimeter device. At least four different versions of DynoWiper have been discovered to date. The wiper's functionality involves initializing a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) called Mersenne Twister, enumerating files and corrupting them using the PRNG, and deleting files. The malware does not have a persistence mechanism, a way to communicate with a command-and-control (C2) server, or execute shell commands, and it does not attempt to hide the activity from security programs. The attack targeting the manufacturing sector company involved the use of a PowerShell-based wiper dubbed LazyWiper that scripts overwrites files on the system with pseudorandom 32-byte sequences to render them unrecoverable. The malware used in the incident involving renewable energy farms was executed directly on the HMI machine. In the CHP plant and the manufacturing sector company, the malware was distributed within the Active Directory domain via a PowerShell script executed on a domain controller. The attacker used credentials obtained from the on-premises environment in attempts to gain access to cloud services, downloading selected data from services such as Exchange, Teams, and SharePoint. The attacker was particularly interested in files and email messages related to OT network modernization, SCADA systems, and technical work carried out within the organizations. The attack on Poland's energy sector in December 2025 was the first large-scale attack against decentralized energy resources (DERs) like wind turbines and solar farms. The attack occurred during a period when Poland was struggling with low temperatures and snowstorms just before the New Year. Dragos assessed with moderate confidence that the activity reflects tradecraft and objectives in line with the Electrum threat group, which overlaps with Sandworm. Electrum has worked alongside another threat actor, tracked as Kamicite, to conduct destructive attacks against Ukrainian ISPs and persistent scanning of industrial devices in the US. Kamicite gained initial access and persistence against organizations, and Electrum executed follow-on activity. Dragos has tracked Kamicite activities against the European ICS/OT supply chain since late 2024. The attack on Poland's energy sector was significant because it was the first major attack against decentralized energy resources (DERs). There was no evidence that the adversary had full control of the DERs, and there was no attempt to mis-operate these resources. Poland was fortunate because DERs make up a smaller portion of its energy portfolio than some other countries. If this same style of attack happened in the US, Australia, or certain parts of Europe where DERs are more prevalent, it could have been potentially catastrophic for the system. The attack highlighted the ongoing threat faced by the energy sector, with threat actors gaining initial access through vulnerable Internet-facing edge devices before deploying wipers that damaged remote terminal units (RTUs). CISA advised OT operators to prioritize updates that allow firmware verification and to immediately change default passwords on things like edge devices. Dragos recommended that organizations ensure architecture is defensible through methods like strict authorization practices, OT/IT segmentation, strict vendor access governance, secure remote access, and ICS network visibility and monitoring.

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UNC5142 Abuses Blockchain Smart Contracts to Spread Malware via Compromised WordPress Sites

A financially motivated threat actor, UNC5142, has been exploiting blockchain smart contracts to distribute information stealers such as Atomic, Lumma, Rhadamanthys, and Vidar on Windows and macOS systems. The attacks leverage compromised WordPress websites and a technique called 'EtherHiding' to hide malicious code on public blockchains. The campaign uses a multi-stage JavaScript downloader named CLEARSHORT to deliver malware, with the first stage interacting with a malicious smart contract on the BNB Smart Chain. The smart contract retrieves a landing page from an external server, which then employs social engineering tactics to infect the system. Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) flagged about 14,000 web pages containing injected JavaScript associated with UNC5142, indicating a broad targeting of vulnerable WordPress sites. However, no activity has been observed since July 23, 2025.

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