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Campaign

Marimo exploitation delivered through a typosquatted Hugging Face Space

Updated 16.04.2026 19:58
Case score 58
Members 1 First seen 16.04.2026 19:58 Latest activity 16.04.2026 19:58

Overview

Attackers used **Hugging Face Spaces** as delivery infrastructure after exploiting **CVE-2026-39987** in **Marimo**, placing a typosquatted Space named **vsccode-modetx** online with **install-linux.sh** and a **kagent** binary. The payload chain fetched the script with curl, installed a previously undocumented **NKAbuse** variant, and set up persistence with **systemd**, **cron**, or **macOS LaunchAgent**. Available evidence points to active exploitation and malware delivery, but not to the operator's identity or the full reach of the activity.
Latest development Open development history 1 earlier development Sysdig discloses Marimo CVE-2026-39987 exploitation and NKAbuse delivery Sysdig reports active exploitation of CVE-2026-39987 in Marimo reactive Python notebook, with attackers using Hugging Face Spaces to deliver a new NKAbuse variant that can execute shell commands and return output to the operator; the report recommends upgrading to version 0.23.0 or later or blocking external access to /terminal/ws.
  1. Earlier development

    April 12 Hugging Face Space vsccode-modetx hosts NKAbuse dropper

    An attacker created a Hugging Face Space named vsccode-modetx, a typosquat for VS Code, and used it to host install-linux.sh and a malware binary named kagent; after exploitation of Marimo, the payload was fetched with curl and installed with persistence through systemd, cron, or macOS LaunchAgent.

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Campaign Hugging Face Spaces vsccode-modetx dropper campaign
Updated 16.04.2026 19:58 Lead Contribution 58
Campaign Active

The **April 12, 2026** campaign abusing **Hugging Face Spaces** broadened malicious delivery against AI platform users and increased the risk of stealthy payload execution. An attacker used a typosquatted Space, **vsccode-modetx**, to host **install-linux.sh** and a malware binary named **kagent**. The chain used **curl** to fetch the script, install the payload, and set persistence through **systemd**, **cron**, or **LaunchAgent**. The operation matters because it leverages a legitimate-looking HTTPS service to reduce detection while delivering post-exploitation tooling.